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A NEW FORM OF FAMILY PLANNING? THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF NO-CHILD PROVISIONS IN
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
Joline F. Sikaitis+
I'm 53 years old and I've been married and divorced twice. I
had two children with my first wife .... With my second wife, I
have one teenage son who is finishing prep school. By and
large, they are great kids and I love them very much.
I met Julie... shortly after my second divorce, about a year
and a half ago. We love each other and have decided to get
married. Julie ... has never been married and she is twenty two
years younger than I am.
The one stipulation I've made before committing to marriage,
and I hold firm on, is that Julie had to agree not to start a
family. She said she was willing to sign a prenuptial agreement
promising that. It may sound selfish but I want to be the most
important person in her life. I don't want to share that position
with children. I know from experience how demanding of your
time they can be.'
As the legal right to private ordering expands, the ability of couples to
structure their private relationships presents issues yet to be resolved.2
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author wishes to thank the dedicated editors and staff of the Catholic University
Law Review whose hard work brought this paper to fruition. The author is deeply grateful
to Brent for his endless support and friendship and to her mom, without whose inspiration
and guidance none of this would be possible
1. My Third Wife Is a Trophy Wife, 50 PLUS.COM, at http://www.50plusmag.com/
relationships/111402trophywife/l11402trophywife.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
2. See Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1015, 1017-18 (1985), LEXIS, Individual Law Reviews & Journals,
Mijlr File (describing private ordering as "[tihe liberal ideal that individuals have
fundamental rights, and should freely choose to make of their lives what they wish").
Some family lawyers advocate pushing the limits of what may be included in a prenuptial
agreement, suggesting
[i]n some instances, provisions in an agreement that might not be enforceable
when drafted may become legally valid because of future statutory amendments
and case law interpretation. It is sometimes useful, therefore, to insert provisions
into such agreements which are on the cutting edge of current law. If the law
changes, significant gain and protection may thus be realized by the client and
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Prenuptial agreements containing no-child provisions test the limits of
parties' ability to structure their relationships, and are becoming
increasingly prevalent.3 Although many couples have entered into these• • 4
agreements, the issue of enforceability has yet to be litigated.
Prenuptial agreements are contracts entered into by parties to a
marriage prior to the marriage.5 Generally, prenuptial agreements
the heirs. Of course, the lawyer should inform the client in writing of possible
enforceability problems to limit malpractice exposure.
PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CONTRACTS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO DRAFTING AND
NEGOTIATING ENFORCEABLE MARITAL AND COHABITATION AGREEMENTS 109
(Edward L. Winer & Lewis Becker eds., 1993) [hereinafter PREMARITAL AND MARITAL
CONTRACTS].
3. See Jill Brooke, A Promise to Love, Honor and Bear No Children, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2002, § 9, at 1 (arguing that no-child provisions, although becoming more
prevalent, are speculated by legal experts to be unenforceable). In referring to the
increased commonality of no-child provisions in prenuptial agreements, Mitchell Schrage,
a New York matrimonial lawyer, stated, "Ten years ago, we had one every other year...
Now it's four or five. What you often see is the man who's worth $10 million saying that
there's no negotiations ... [and t]hese women are often younger and want to get married,
so they acquiesce." Id. Mr. Schrage estimated that as many as twenty percent of the
prenuptial contracts he handles "explicitly rule out children . . . the richer you are, the
more you want it on paper. The men are usually older and they don't want to raise kids
again." Sarah Baxter, Rich Couples Write Babies Out of the Marriage Lines, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Oct. 20, 2002, at 28, LEXIS, Major Newspapers, Ttimes File (quoting
Mitchell Schrage).
4. But see Height v. Height, 187 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (N.Y. 1959) (asserting that an
agreement contemplating the forbearance from having children was void, as public policy
dictates that the primary purpose of marriage is to procreate, and the right to regular
sexual conduct is implicit in a marriage). Although Height has not been revisited, its
precedential value is questionable, as it was decided prior to the shift in judicial opinion
regarding prenuptial agreements. Now, New York statutorily addresses prenuptial
agreements.
An agreement by the parties, made before or during the marriage shall be valid
and enforceable in a matrimonial action if such an agreement is in writing,
subscribed by the parties, and acknowledged or proven in the manner required
to entitle a deed to be recorded. Such an agreement may include (1) a contract
to make a testamentary provision of any kind, or a waiver of any right to elect
against the provisions of a will; (2) provision for the ownership, division or
distribution of separate and marital property; (3) provision for the amount and
duration of maintenance or other terms and conditions of the marriage
relationship, subject to the provisions of section 5-311 of the general obligations
law, and provided that such terms were fair and reasonable at the time of the
making of the agreement and are not unconscionable at the time of entry of final
judgment; and (4) provision for the custody, care, education and maintenance of
any child of the parties, subject to the provisions of section two hundred forty of
this chapter. Nothing in this subdivision shall be deemed to affect the validity of
any agreement made prior to the effective date of this subdivision.
N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236(B)(3)(McKinney 1999).
5. FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 59.02 (Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 3d. ed. 2004)
(arguing that prenuptial agreements are intended to alter state-imposed formulas set in
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provide for the alteration of legal rights to property upon either
dissolution of the marriage or death.6  Prenuptial agreements have
become more prevalent due to the ascendance of private ordering and
higher rates of divorce and remarriage . These agreements attempt to
statutory guidelines for property distribution in the event of death or divorce). This
Comment will address only prenuptial agreements in the event of divorce. See generally
Kirk Johnson, Gay Divorce: Few Markers in This Realm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at
A20 (noting that prenuptial agreements may also be entered into by gay or lesbian
couples, although these agreements would not technically be termed a prenuptial
agreement).
6. FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 5, § 59.01 (noting that prenuptial
agreements may also be referred to as antenuptial agreements, antenuptial contracts,
premarital agreements, premarital contracts, or prenuptial contracts). For the purposes of
this Comment, they will be referred to as prenuptial agreements.
7. See ARLENE G. DUBIN, PRENUPS FOR LOVERS 15 (2001) ("Statistics are scarce in
the prenuptial area. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 5% to 10% percent of couples and
20% of remarried couples now enter into prenups. By 2020, I predict that more than 50%
of couples will be preceded down the aisle by prenups.") The prefatory note of the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA) offers several explanations for the increased
utility of prenuptial agreements:
The number of marriages between persons previously married and the number
of marriages between persons each of whom is intending to pursue a career is
steadily increasing. For these and other reasons, it is becoming more and more
common for persons contemplating marriage to seek to resolve by agreement
certain issues presented by the forthcoming marriage.
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT prefatory note, 9C U.L.A. 36 (2001); see also
DUBIN, supra note 7, at 17 (noting that seventy-five percent of divorced people remarry
within five years and sixty percent of remarriages end in divorce); Catherine Bigelow,
Marriage, American-Style; The Modern Prenup: Who Gets Them and Who Needs Them,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2003, at 24, LEXIS, Major Newspapers, Sfchrn File (describing a
Center for Disease Control report, published in May 2001, that found that forty-three
percent of first marriages dissolved within fifteen years, that twenty percent of marriages
dissolved within five years, and approximately thirty-three percent dissolved in ten years);
Advance Report of Final Marriage Statistics, 1988, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTIC REP.
(Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Hyattsville, MD) Aug. 26, 1991, at 1, 4 (reporting that four
out of ten marriages involved a party who had previously been married); Melanie
Thernstrom, Untying The Knot, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, § 6 at 38 (reporting that a
"survey by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, found that 78% of divorce
attorneys . . . say that their caseloads are steady or increasing"); DAVID POPENOE &
BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR
UNIONS: THE SOCIAL HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA (1999),
http:i/marriage.rutgers.edu[Publications/SOOU/TEXTSOOU
2 0 0 3 .htm (last visited Oct.
19, 2004) ("Overall, the chances remain very high-still around 50 percent-that a
marriage started today will end in divorce."). The necessity for premarital agreements in a
time of rising divorce rates has also been echoed in state court decisions. See Brooks v.
Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1050 (Alaska 1987) (finding that "people with previous 'bad luck'
with domestic life may not be willing to risk marriage again without the ability to
safeguard their financial interests"); cf. Eule v. Eule, 320 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Il1. App. Ct.
1974) (illustrating an extreme example of the usefulness of premarital contracts). Prior to
the marriage the husband was married nine times, the wife was married six times, and they
had been married to each other three times. Id.
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designate, prior to the dissolution of the marriage, property rights, duties,
and responsibilities which, ordinarily, the court would designate upon
dissolution of the marriage.8  As such, the creation of prenuptial
agreements invokes the concept of "private ordering."9
In the past twenty years, an ascendant right to private ordering has
paralleled Supreme Court decisions bolstering an individual's right to be
left alone.'0 Such decisions suggest that the government should not
intrude upon contracts of adults." Parties acceding to a no-child
provision in a prenuptial agreement contemplate that a violation of the
provision would result in "[e]ither the cessation of spousal support, 2
waiver of some equity interest or ... the payment of a penalty."'3 This, in
effect, would burden a woman for exercising a fundamental right that she
had contracted away in the prenuptial agreement.
14
The determination of the enforceability of a no-child provision in a
prenuptial agreement requires a balancing of rights and public policies. 5
A court must balance the enforcement of a contract supporting the
surrender of a fundamental right to procreate and its subsequent penalty
8. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 4, 9C U.L.A. 47 (2001). Section 4 of the
UPAA stipulates that "[a] premarital agreement becomes effective upon the marriage."
Id. For cohabitants who are not married, the official comment for section 4 suggests that
"the parties must look to other law in the jurisdiction." Id. However, courts are beginning
to uphold agreements between unmarried cohabitants as valid providing that they do not
offend public policy. Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
9. See FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 5, § 59.02.
10. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (arguing that
homosexual and heterosexual couples should share the same right to privacy); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447, 454 (1971) (holding that single and married couples warrant
the same privacy considerations for the use of contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding the right to privacy includes the use of birth control).
11. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
12. The enforceability of a waiver of spousal support in a prenuptial agreement varies
from state to state. LAURA W. MORGAN & BRETT R. TURNER, ATTACKING AND
DEFENDING PRE-MARITAL AGREEMENTS § 9.042 (2001). Section 3 of the UPAA
stipulates that a term agreeing to the "modification or elimination of spousal support" is
permissible in premarital contracts. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3, 9C
U.L.A. 43 (2001). However, if enforcement of the term modifying or eliminating spousal
support would cause the party attempting to avoid the term "to be eligible for support
under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital dissolution," a
court may avoid enforcement of the term. Id. § 6(b), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001).
13. E-mail from Mitchell Schrage, Partner, Mitchell Schrage & Associates, PLLC, to
Joline F. Sikaitis (Sept. 4, 2003, 13:07:57 EST) (on file with the author).
14. Contra Margaret F. Brinig & Doug W. Allen, These Boots Are Made for Walking:
Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 126, 126-27 (2000)
(noting that women are more likely to file a petition for divorce).
15. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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against countervailing public policies supporting procreation, marital
stability, and a woman's procreative rights."
This Comment analyzes the enforceability of no-child provisions in
prenuptial agreements within the context of private ordering. It
describes the emergence of the right to privacy and the subsequent
ascendance of private ordering between adults. Next, this Comment
explores how evolving social trends have affected the enforceability of
prenuptial agreements and the development of the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act (UPAA). This Comment takes note of the silence of the
UPAA and state courts regarding the enforceability of provisions in
prenuptial agreements that intend to structure the incidents of the
marriage. This Comment also acknowledges the trend in construing
prenuptial agreements in a quasi-commercial manner, but suggests that
such treatment is inappropriate, given the quasi-public nature of
marriage and the concept of marriage as a status, rather than a contract.
This Comment argues that no-child provisions may be successfully
challenged on both public policy and constitutional grounds. First, the
provision would be void as against public policy because the policies
against enforcement outweigh the policies in favor of enforcement.
Second, the constitutional challenge would argue successfully that
enforcement would excessively entangle the judiciary in infringement of
a fundamental right. Accordingly, this Comment predicts that no-child
provisions will be deemed unenforceable.
I. INCREASING AUTONOMY: A BALANCING OF RIGHTS
A. The Emergence of Private Ordering
Before the Supreme Court ever established a right to privacy, it was
articulated by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in an 1890 law review
16. Cf PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CONTRACTS, supra note 2, at 109 ("Even if
some of the provisions are not legally enforceable because of technical or other
deficiencies or changes in law, judges will frequently find ways to hold parties to
agreements by ordering a similar result in a legal proceeding."). If a woman acceding to a
no-child provision was promised an equity share for compliance with the no-child
provision at the time of divorce, but later breached the term by having children, she would
want the no-child provision severed from the contract. Id. at 99. When adjudging the
enforceability of contracts that are contrary to public policy, such as restrictive covenants
and exculpatory or penalty clauses, a court may refuse to enforce the specific term, and
still enforce the rest of the agreement. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.8 (3d
ed. 1999). Such enforcement is "favorable to the party who was bound to the [offensive]
clause." Id.; see, e.g., Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, 678 So. 2d
765, 767 (Ala. 1996) (finding that although a retired law partner did not comply with an
unreasonable restraint on which his deferred compensation was conditioned, he was still
entitled to the compensation because the restraint was unreasonable and contrary to
public policy).
2004]
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article entitled The Right to Privacy.7 Brandeis and Warren advocated
that individuals have a privacy interest regarding their "inviolate
personality." The decision in Griswold v. Connecticut19 formalized this
nascent right to privacy that Brandeis and Warren had advocated three-
quarters of a century prior.20 In assessing a Connecticut statute that
made it a crime for any person to use a drug or device that prevented
contraception, the Court found a zone of privacy protecting the married
couple from governmental intrusion.' Though the Constitution does not
explicitly reference this zone of privacy, the Court derives authority from
the overlapping "emanations" and "penumbras" of other explicitly
22protected constitutional rights. The Court in Griswold asserted that
state intrusion into the inviolable zone of marital privacy was "repulsive
to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage.
2 3
17. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
18. Id. at 205. The privacy right addressed by Brandeis and Warren related to
privacy in the context of tort relief. Id. at 193-94 (noting that the notion that "the
individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the
common law"). The article suggests that the right to personal privacy extends from a
general right to privacy, arguing:
If we are correct in this conclusion, the existing law affords a principle which
may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion either by
the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other
modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds .... If, then, the
decisions indicate a general right to privacy of thoughts, emotions, and
sensations, these should receive the same protection, whether expressed in
writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or in facial expression.
Id. at 206.
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20. Id. at 492. The dissenting opinion cites to the Brandeis and Warren article, noting
that the concept of a right of privacy "gained currency" as a result of the Brandeis and
Warren article. Id. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 485-86.
22. Id. at 484-86.
23. Id. at 486. This emphasis on marital privacy was further emphasized in the
concurring opinion, authored by Justice Goldberg, when he wrote, "the rights to marital
privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the
fundamental rights specifically." Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Contra Janet L.
Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J.
1519, 1542 (1994) (questioning whether Griswold's emphasis on family metaphors may
have been intended to mitigate the heated debate surrounding contraception, Planned
Parenthood, and changing social mores). Griswold may be narrowly construed as
extending this right to privacy only to partners in a marital relationship. See 381 U.S. at
486. Although Griswold emphasized a right to privacy, it incontrovertibly stressed privacy
in the context of the marital relationship. Id. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in
Griswold cites to Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961):
Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity
of property rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life.
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Privacy rights were extended to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v.
Baird.24 The Court held that "the marital couple is not an independent
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellect and emotional makeup."25
Eisenstadt extended the right to privacy to protect individuals from
"government invasion into the personal decision whether or not to have
a child.,
26
In Marvin v. Marvin,7 the California Supreme Court extended privacy
concepts to contracts between unmarried cohabitants.m The court stated
that as long as the contract was not based on "illicit meretricious
consideration," the parties possessed a right to "order their economic
affairs as they choose., 29 In finding the contract enforceable, the court
expressed its desire to remove judicial barriers that might prevent
fulfillment of the expectations of the parties) 0
And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found
to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted
Constitutional right .... Of this whole 'private realm of family life' it is difficult
to imagine what is more private or more intimate than a husband and wife's
marital relations.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
24. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
25. Id. at 453. The decision in Eisenstadt definitively expanded the right to privacy to
individuals outside of a marital relationship. Id. The Court decided Eisenstadt on equal
protection grounds and expressed discomfort with the Massachusetts law banning the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals. Id. at 454. Justice Brennan, in the
majority opinion, noted that not allowing the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
individuals, but sanctioning its distribution to married couples, would authorize "dissimilar
treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated." Id.
26. Id. at 453.
27. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
28. Id. at 110 (providing that contracts between unmarried cohabitants were
enforceable as long as they did not involve contracting for sexual services). The California
Supreme Court explained:
The fact that a man and woman live together without marriage, and engage in a
sexual relationship, does not in itself invalidate agreements between them
relating to their earnings, property, or expenses. Neither is such an agreement
invalid merely because the parties may have contemplated the creation or
continuation of a nonmarital relationship when they entered into it. Agreements
between nonmarital partners fail only to the extent that they rest upon a
consideration of meretricious sexual services. Thus the rule asserted by
defendant, that a contract fails if it is "involved in" or made "in contemplation"
of a nonmarital relationship, cannot be reconciled with the decisions.
Id. at 113.
29. Id. at 116.
30. Id. at 122 (asserting that although societal mores have changed drastically, the
decision is not intended to denigrate the importance of marriage).
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The progression from Griswold to Marvin parallels a cultural shift
from family to individual' Similar to the shift from status to contract,
the shift from family to individual redefined the rights, roles, and
expectations of members in a family unit." When status and family were
the dominant motifs, family members' interactions were based on their
expected or assumed role in that family unit.33 As the dominant motif
shifted towards contract and individualism, interactions could be
negotiated or bargained for, as the parties came to be viewed as
presumptively equal.34
31. Dolgin, supra note 23. Divorce laws paralleled this shift. Nicole D. Lindsey,
Note, Marriage and Divorce: Degrees of "I Do," An Analysis of the Ever-Changing
Paradigm of Divorce, 9 J. LAW. & PUB. POL'Y 265, 267 (1998). In California, prior to
1969, fault-based divorce was operative. Id. at 267. To obtain a divorce, the petitioning
spouse had to prove that the other spouse was at fault. Id. Under this model, one party
was responsible for the divorce and the other was blameless. Id. In 1969, the first no-fault
divorce bill was signed into law by California Governor Ronald Reagan. Id. No-fault
divorce removed the requirement of demonstrating fault. Id. at 268. In 1970, the proposal
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act was intended as a guide for states to create
similar no-fault divorce provisions. Id. By 1985, all states had adopted a version of no-
fault divorce. Id. The move to no-fault divorce was criticized for exacerbating an already
high divorce rate. Id. Between 1970 and 1990, the divorce rate increased by thirty-four
percent. Id. at 269.
32. See Dolgin, supra note 23, at 1546; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW
FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 14-15 (1981) (detailing how the concept of
companionate marriage redefined marriage as a "quest for personal happiness" that was
"prompted by mutual attraction and interests [and the desire for] close parent-child
relationships").
33. Dolgin, supra note 23, at 1526.
34. See id.; Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Career Assets:
The Ascendancy of Self over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. REV. 59, 67 (2001)
(describing the effect of the concept of companionate marriage, Kelly noted, "The concept
of marriage as an institution of the state and a determinant of status was being converted
to one predominantly governed by individual choices and agreements-the view of
marriage as a contract"). In explaining this cultural shift, Dolgin invokes Sir Henry
Maine's theory promulgated in his work Ancient Law.
It is Contract. Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of
society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of
Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which
all these relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals.
Dolgin supra note 23, at 1525 (quoting HENRY J.S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 100 (J.M. Dent
& Sons 1917) (1861)); JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY
AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 35-37 (1997) (describing how no-fault divorce,
judicial acceptance of prenuptial agreements, and challenges to the notion of marriage as
reserved for opposite sex partners have redefined the American family). "[Miore and
more the American legal system has come to view adult family members as it views
business associates-as autonomous individuals free to negotiate the terms of their
relationships and the terms of their relationships' demise." Id. at 37. Cases decided in the
1970s demonstrate this shift. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979)
(undermining parental authority by invalidating a statute requiring a minor to secure
parental consent to obtain an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
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The Court in Lawrence v. Texas35 emphasized the liberty of individuals
to engage in conduct of their choosing without governmental
interference. Justice Kennedy, in the majority opinion, asserted that the
derivation of this right originated in the Due Process Clause." In striking
down a Texas sodomy law targeting homosexuals, the Court asserted that
individual decisions between couples regarding their intimate
relationships, regardless of whether they relate to procreation, should be• 7
free from governmental interference.
Although admittedly extending various fundamental rights and liberty
interests, the line of privacy cases underscores the ascendance of private
(diminishing the uniqueness of the marital relationship by stating "the marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.").
35. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
36. Id. at 578.
37. Id. The decision in Lawrence stressed concepts of bodily autonomy and personal
liberty:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is
the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992)). However, it remains controversial whether the language of Lawrence was meant
to extend a privacy right or simply reject the Court's earlier decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Robert Post contrasts the Bowers and Lawrence decisions
to explore the significance of Lawrence:
Lawrence is a strikingly innovative opinion. Although it nods in the direction
of the traditional approach, noting "in the past half century" an "emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex," Lawrence uses
these observations more to chip away at Bowers's historical references than to
establish the constitutionally protected nature of a liberty interest in private
sodomy between consenting adults. Although the Court in Lawrence also
repeatedly invokes the autonomy approach to substantive due process,
announcing at the beginning of its opinion that "liberty presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct," it makes no focused effort to link the behavior regulated by the Texas
statute to a specifically constitutional dimension of autonomy, like the self-
definition that was so important to Blackmun's dissent in Bowers. Instead the
theme of autonomy floats weightlessly through Lawrence, invoked but never
endowed with analytic traction.
Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4. 96-97 (2003) (footnotes
omitted).
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ordering in modern jurisprudence. Private ordering relies on the
concept that adults should be able to express their wishes, free from
governmental intrusion. It is premised on the construct that individuals
are best situated to make decisions about their own future, and the state
may not interfere."°
B. The Outer Boundaries of Private Ordering
1. Contracts Contravening Public Policy
As a general rule, freedom of contract is operative unless a court
determines that some other interest outweighs the interest in the
individual's autonomy and justified expectations.41  Two primary
concerns may motivate a court to invalidate an agreement on public
policy grounds. First, a court could find that refusing to uphold the
contract would "discourage undesirable conduct by the parties or by
others., 42 Second, a court may view judicial enforcement of the contract
as "an inappropriate use of the judicial process.,
43
38. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515-16 (1965); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d
106, 114-15 (Cal. 1976).
39. See Mnookin, supra note 2, at 1018.
40. Id. (quoting J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY, in ON LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 68 (R. McCallum ed. 1947)) ("Each spouse . . . 'is the person most
interested in his own well-being. . . with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the
most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those
that can be possessed by anyone else."' (second omission in original)).
41. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.1, at 321. Public policy concerns may limit
freedom of contract:
The power to contract is not unlimited. While as a general rule there is the
utmost freedom of action in this regard, some restrictions are placed upon the
right by legislation, by public policy and by the nature of things. Parties cannot
make a binding contract in violation of law or of public policy.
Sternaman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 763, 764 (N.Y. 1902); Holman v. Johnson, 98
Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775) ("The principle of public policy is this: ex dolo malo non
oritur actio [no right of action arises from one's own fraud]. No court will lend its aid to a
man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act."); see also Samuel
Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 374 (1921) ("Observation of results
has proved that unlimited freedom of contract, like unlimited freedom in other directions,
does not necessarily lead to public or individual welfare and that the only ultimate test of
proper limitations is that provided by experience.").
42. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.1, at 322.
43. Id.
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Surrogacy contracts44 are a prime example of contracts originally found
unenforceable for contravening public policy.45  Traditional surrogacy
contracts that involve the exchange of money and do not allow the
surrogate the option to reconsider are considered offensive to several
pervasive public policies such as: the policy against child bartering;46 the
best interest of the child standard;47 laws that make the surrender of
parental rights revocable;8 and the public interest in the "natural
family., 49  However, in many states surrogacy contracts entered into
without the exchange of money and reserving the option of the surrogate
mother to change her mind are often enforceable.50
2. Excessive Entanglement
Courts have established limits to the enforceability of prenuptial
agreements.5 In a prominent Pennsylvania Superior Court decision, the
court found the excessive entanglement exception operative." In
Zummo v. Zummo, the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to enforce
a verbal provision of a prenuptial agreement stipulating the religious
upbringing of children from the marriage. 3 It posited that enforcement
44. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1998) (defining a surrogacy contract as
an agreement between a couple and a woman who agrees to artificial insemination and to
carry a child to term. After the birth of the child, the woman is separated from the child
and the couple is regarded as both the lawful father and mother.).
45. Id. ("The payment of money to a surrogate is perhaps criminal, and potentially
degrading to women.") The court also found the contractual surrender of parental rights
to be invalid. Id. at 1245-46. The New Jersey Supreme Court contends that it has long
been the state policy that, when possible, children should remain with their natural
parents. Id. at 1246-47.
46. Id. at 1240-42.
47. Id. at 1256-60.
48. Id. at 1264.
49. Id. at 1245-50.
50. Id. at 1264 (finding no "legal prohibition against surrogacy when the mother
volunteers, without any payment, to act as a surrogate and is given the right to change her
mind and to assert her parental rights"). State legislation draws similar distinctions.
Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (West 2003), D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
401(4) to -402(a) (2001), IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1-1 to -2 (Michie 2004), N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-18-05 (2004), TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(A)-(C) (2003), UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-204 (2003) (announcing that surrogacy contracts are unenforceable), and KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie 2003), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 2003),
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1995), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.240 (West 1997)
(denying enforcement of surrogacy contracts if money is exchanged), with ARK. CODE
ANN. 9-10-201(b)-(c) (Michie 2002) (establishing the presumption that a child born to a
surrogate mother is the child of the parents who contracted for the surrogate's services).
51. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
52. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
53. Id. at 1147; see also In re Marriage of Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 346-47 (Cal.
App. 1996) (citing Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1146-48); Sotnick v. Sotnick, 650 So. 2d 157, 160
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would involve excessive entanglement and encroachment by the state on
a fundamental right of religious freedom protected by the First
Amendment.
4
The theoretical underpinnings of Zummo are derived from the
excessive entanglement exception.5  Private individuals, entities, or
actors may infringe upon one another's constitutionally protected
liberties, free from governmental intrusion. However, "if the
government affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates private
conduct that violates the Constitution," then "the government must
cease its involvement with the private actor or the private entity must
comply with the Constitution.""
C. The UPAA and the Trend Towards Enforceability
Prior to the 1970s, courts deemed prenuptial agreements entered into
in anticipation of divorce void as against public policy.58 The advent of
no-fault divorce and the rising divorce rate prompted courts to
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Zummo for the proposition that legal authority is
generally against agreements pre-determining the religion in which the child will be
raised).
54. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1146. The court believed that enforcement of the provision
"encroaches upon the fundamental right of individuals to question, to doubt, and to
change their religious convictions and to expose their children to their changed beliefs."
Id. (finding that the source of these rights was found in the Establishment and Free
Exercise clauses of the First Amendment). Id.
55. See id.; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 6.4.1 (2d. ed. 2002).
56. E.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 14, 18-19 (1883). The state-action
doctrine implies that the Constitution applies to government action but not private action.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55. However, both state and federal statutes may limit private
infringement of fundamental rights through laws requiring the private actor to comply
with the same standards as those set out in the Constitution. Id.
57. CHEMERINSKY,supra note 55, § 6.4.4.3; see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13-15
(1948) (exemplifying the entanglement exception). On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court applied the entanglement exception proffering, "Action of state courts and judicial
officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 14. Shelley involved a restrictive
covenant whereby those in the neighborhood agreed that they would not sell their homes
to African-American families. Id. at 4-5. The lower courts upheld the restrictive covenant
on the grounds that the private contract was protected by the state-action doctrine. Id. at
6. The Supreme Court rejected this explanation and asserted that the entanglement
exception was operative. Id. at 19-20.
58. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 295 (Cal. 1973) (differentiating
between contracts made "in contemplation that the marriage relation will continue until
the parties are separated by death" from contracts made in contemplation of divorce); see
also Katherine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 65, 72-73 (1998).
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reconsider their position. 9 Posner v. Posner,6 the seminal decision
finding prenuptial agreements enforceable, took note of these societalS 61
and legal shifts and responded accordingly. Other states soon followed
Florida's lead and revised their position on the enforceability of
prenuptial agreements.
62
The UPAA, proposed in 1987, was devised to standardize laws
regarding the enforceability of prenuptial agreements.63 To date, twenty-
five states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UPAA. 64 The
UPAA provides two grounds for finding prenuptial agreements
unenforceable. 6' First, if parties did not execute the agreement
59. See Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970). The court scrutinized
several societal and legal shifts that support the enforceability of prenuptial agreements.
With divorce such a commonplace fact of life, it is fair to assume that many
prospective marriage partners whose property and familial situation is such as to
generate a valid antenuptial agreement settling their property rights upon the
death of either, might want to consider and discuss also-and agree upon, if
possible-the disposition of their property and the alimony rights of the wife in
the event their marriage, despite their best efforts, should fail.
Id.
60. 233 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1970).
61. Id. at 384. In rendering prenuptial agreements enforceable, the court referenced
changing divorce laws, notably the advent of California's no-fault divorce law:
This court can take judicial notice of the fact that the ratio of marriages to
divorces has reached a disturbing rate in many states; and that a new concept of
divorce-in which there is no "guilty" party-is being advocated by many groups
and has been adopted by the State of California in a recent revision of its divorce
laws providing for dissolution of a marriage upon pleading and proof of
"irreconcilable differences" between the parties, without assessing the fault for
the failure of the marriage against either party.
Id.
62. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 731-32 (Colo. 1982); Burtoff v.
Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1088 (D.C. 1980).
63. See generally UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9C U.L.A. 47 (2001)
(setting standards for the creation and enforceability of premarital contracts). Section 6 of
the UPAA delineates when a court should declare a premarital agreement unenforceable.
1d. § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48-49 (2001). Section 9 of the UPAA, entitled "Application and
Construction," states, "This [Act] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this [Act] among states
enacting it." Id. § 9, 9C U.L.A. 57 (2001) (alteration in original).
64. LEGAL INFORMATION INST., UNIFORM MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY LAWS
INDICATOR, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol9.html#prema (last visited Oct. 9,
2004). The states that have adopted the UPAA are: Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Virginia and the District of Columbia. Id.
65. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48 (2001). The UPAA
also stipulates conditions under which a prenuptial agreement may not be enforceable:
(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom
enforcement is sought proves that:
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voluntarily, it could be unenforceable. 66 Second, if the agreement was
unconscionable due to a contracting party's failure to disclose all
property or financial obligations, it would not be enforceable.67 Though
the UPAA encourages a contract-like view of prenuptial agreements,
some states that have not adopted the UPAA have gone further,
asserting that it is not a court's place to inquire into substantive
provisions of a prenuptial agreement. 68
D. Prenuptial Contracts Regulating the Ongoing Marriage
The preponderance of prenuptial agreements address the allocation of
property and support subsequent to the dissolution of the marriage.
69
Although the UPAA does not explicitly refer to the regulation of
conduct, it permits provisions for "any other matter, including [the
parties'] personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy
(1) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
(2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before
execution of the agreement, that party:
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or
financial obligations of the other party;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the
disclosure provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate
knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
(b) If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal
support and that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement
to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the time of
separation or marital dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the
agreement, may require the other party to provide support to the extent
necessary to avoid that eligibility.
(c) An issue of unconscionability of a premarital agreement shall be decided
by the court as a matter of law.
Id. § 6(a)-(c), 9C U.L.A. 48-49 (2001).
66. Id. § 6(a)(1), 9C U.L.A. 48 (2001).
67. Id. § 6(a)(2), 9C U.L.A. 48-49 (2001). Nondisclosure of property and financial
obligations could only be permissible if the adverse party expressly waived their right to
disclosure or "could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial
obligations of the other party." Id. § 6(a)(2)(i)-(iii).
68. E.g., White v. White, 617 So. 2d 732, 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Howell v.
Landry, 386 S.E.2d 610, 615 (N.C. App. 1989) (applying contract principles of construction
to prenuptial agreements); Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1990) (asserting
that that the reasonableness of the prenuptial contract is not an appropriate subject for
judicial review); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 114 (W. Va. 1985) (advancing that using the
standard of fairness subjects the prenuptial agreement to the type of "wealth
redistribution that these agreements are designed to prevent").
69. See Suzanne Reynolds, Content Provisions of the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act, FAIR SHARE, Mar. 1998, at 6-7.
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or a statute imposing a criminal penalty."70 The official comment to the
UPAA stipulates that an agreement may be made regarding "choice of
abode, freedom to pursue career opportunities, and so on. ' 7' The UPAA
seemingly suggests that parties may contract on conduct in an ongoing
marriage, permitting that it does not violate public policy.
7
The Restatement of Contracts provides some guidance on
unenforceable provisions." Restatement Section 190 states that
provisions of contracts intending to alter the "essential incidents" of
marriage shall not be enforced. 4  The Louisiana Supreme Court
attempted to differentiate between essential and nonessential incidents
of the marriage.71 The court stated that "with the advent of no-fault
divorce and the changes in society that such laws represent, public policy
has changed and the traditional rule . . . has given way to the more
realistic view that such agreements are valid and enforceable under
certain circumstances."76
70. UNiF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(8), 9C U.L.A. 48 (2001). The
UPAA delineates the following as acceptable content for prenuptial agreements:
(a) Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to:
(1) the rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of
either or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or located;
(2) the right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume,
expend, assign, create a security interest in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, or
otherwise manage and control property;
(3) the disposition of property upon separation, marital dissolution, death, or the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event;
(4) the modification or elimination of spousal support;
(5) the making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions of
the agreement;
(6) the ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life
insurance policy;
(7) the choice of law governing the construction of the agreement; and
(8) any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in
violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.
(b) The right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital
agreement.
Id. § 3, 9C U.L.A. 43 (2001).
71. Id. § 3(a)(8) cmt., 9C U.L.A. 44 (2001).
72. Id. Nonetheless, courts have rarely enforced provisions in a prenuptial agreement
that attempt to regulate conduct in the ongoing marriage. Reynolds, supra note 69; see
also Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L.
REV. 1169, 1260 (1974) (suggesting that contracts that alter the existing incidents of
marriage will be voided either on the basis of public policy or lack of consideration
because a pre-existing duty cannot be valid consideration).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190 cmt. a (1981).
74. Id.
75. McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So. 2d 85, 93 (La. 1996).
76. Id.
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The regulation of conduct, in an attempt to minimize socially
inappropriate behavior, appears to be permissible. In Stadther v.
Stadther,78 the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals enforced an agreement
which provided for additional payments for the wife should the husband
drink excessively, cause injury to the wife, or engage in other activities
that might lead to divorce. 9 In contrast, courts have deemed less socially
beneficial provisions unenforceable. In Favrot v. Barnes,s0 the Louisiana
Court of Appeals refused to enforce a provision attempting to regulate
the frequency of sexual intercourse during the marriage."'
II. MARRIAGE Is NOT AN ORDINARY CONTRACT
The depiction of a prenuptial agreement as an ordinary contract is
somewhat misplaced.82 As the mid-nineteenth century decision Maynard
v. Hill3 stressed, marriage is not an ordinary contract.4 It differs from an
ordinary contract in several ways because, unlike entry into an ordinary
contract, entry into a marriage creates a legally and publicly recognized
77. See generally Stadther v. Stadther, 526 So. 2d 598, 598-600 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988),
78. 526 So. 2d 598 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988).
79. Id. Courts have also enforced provisions that provide stipulations between the
parties for the upbringing of children. See, e.g., Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S. 100, 112-13
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1942) (holding enforceable a provision that dictated the religion in which
the children would be raised).
80. 332 So. 2d 873 (La. Ct. App. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (La.
1976).
81. Id. at 875 (voiding a prenuptial contract that required the parties to limit sexual
intercourse to once a week). The court held that it was not the place of the judiciary to
uphold a contract altering intimate marital obligations. Id.; see also Koch v. Koch, 232
A.2d 157, 160 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (finding a contract requiring the husband's
mother to live with the couple unenforceable, as it conflicted with the couples' conjugal
relations); Mengal v. Mengal, 108 N.Y.S.2d 992, 995-96 (1951) (holding unenforceable as
against public policy a provision of a prenuptial agreement that stipulated that the wife's
sons would not live with the couple during the marriage).
82. Ellen H. Moskowitz, Some Things Don't Belong in Contracts, NAT'L L.J., June 8,
1998, at A25 ("[Clontracts are commercial tools, at odds with the unconditional, binding
qualities many individuals value about family relationships."); Jeffrey Evans Stake et. al.,
Opportunities for and Limitations of Private Ordering in Family Law, 73 IND. L.J. 535,
558-59 (1998) (commenting on private ordering, Michael Grossberg observed that "unlike
marital choice, the tilt in divorce had always been toward state regulation and severe limits
on private ordering even though over time divorce became more accessible and more
frequent").
83. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
84. Id, at 211 (stating that marriage "is an institution, in the maintenance of which in
its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress").
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status85 that confers both legal and economic benefits on the contracting
parties. s6 Through the support of both parties, the state maintains an
interest in the children of the marriage, and entry into a marital contract
must be solemnized by an appointed official. 8  Based on these
differences which negotiate the rights and responsibilities of both parties,
marriage should not be treated as an ordinary contract."' The passage
and promulgation of the Defense of Marriage Act9° supports the premise
that, despite an increased acceptance of the concept that not all couples
marry to bear children, procreation is a manifest function of the married
couple.91
85. William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources
and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 79
(1990).
86. See, e.g., infra note 212.
87. See, e.g. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003)
(emphasizing the link between the conferral of state benefits and the state's interest in
children).
88. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 400 (Deering 2004); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11
(McKinney 1999) (providing an enumeration of officials who may solemnize a marriage).
North Carolina stipulates the following prerequisites for a valid marriage:
A valid and sufficient marriage is created by the consent of a male and
female person who may lawfully marry, presently to take each other as husband
and wife, freely, seriously and plainly expressed by each in the presence of the
other, either:
(1)a. In the presence of an ordained minister of any religious denomination,
a minister authorized by a church, or a magistrate; and
b. With the consequent declaration by the minister or magistrate that the
persons are husband and wife; or
(2) In accordance with any mode of solemnization recognized by any
religious denomination, or federally or State recognized Indian Nation or Tribe.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1 (2003).
89. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210 (reinforcing the Court's differentiation of marriage
contracts from ordinary civil contracts, as previously alluded to in Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)).
90. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); and 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
91. See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-664 (1996). In discussing the appropriateness of
the Defense of Marriage Act, the House Committee on the Judiciary cites to a prepared
statement by Professor Haley Arkes, a Professor of Jurisprudence and American
Institutions at Amherst College:
We are, each of us, born a man or a woman. The committee needs no
testimony from an expert witness to decode this point: Our engendered
existence, as men and women, offers the most unmistakable, natural signs of the
meaning and purpose of sexuality. And that is the function and purpose of
begetting. At its core, it is hard to detach marriage from what may be called the
"natural teleology of the body": namely, the inescapable fact that only two
people, not three, only a man and a woman, can beget a child.
Id. at 13 (quoting On the Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Haley Arkes, Professor of
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:335
III. THE RIGHT TO BEAR CHILDREN AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
A. Foundations of the Right to "Bear or Beget"
A no-child provision of a prenuptial agreement implies the waiver of a
fundamental right. 92 The Supreme Court has not always recognized
procreation as a fundamental right.93 In Buck v. Bell,94 the Supreme
Court affirmed the constitutionality of a Virginia law allowing for the
involuntary sterilization of the mentally retarded in state institutions.95
Upholding the Virginia law and condoning the sterilization of Carrie
Buck, described as "a feeble minded white woman," the Supreme Court
saw no fundamental right to procreation.96
Skinner v. Oklahoma 9 laid the foundation for procreation as a
fundamental right. 9 The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
statute that mandated sterilization for habitual criminals.99 The Court
asserted that this Oklahoma legislation infringed upon the "basic civil
rights of man" and pronounced that "[m]arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."' Although
Jurisprudence and American Institutions at Amherst College)); see also Linda
Greenhouse, Supreme Court Paved Way for Marriage Ruling with Sodomy Law Decision,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at A24 (noting that thirty-seven states have "laws or
constitutional provisions defining marriage as between a man and a woman").
92. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (designating the right to bear
children as one of the "basic civil rights of man"). The concept of a fundamental right to
procreate and subsequently define one's family was promulgated in a series of cases
originating in post-World War II jurisprudence. Cf. Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape
and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 336 (1997) (noting that the eugenics
movement in the United States declined subsequent to World War II as Nazi atrocities
were exposed, particularly those perpetrated against the mentally ill and handicapped).
93. See generally Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
94. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
95. Id. at 208.
96. See Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENT 331, 336
(1985). By 1935, approximately 20,000 "forced eugenic sterilizations" had been performed
by the United States Government. Id. at 332. In 1980, Carrie Buck and her sister, who
had also been sterilized, were both alive and found to have normal intelligence. Id. at 335-
36.
97. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
98. Gould, supra note 96, at 335-36.
99. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 543.
[A] person who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes "amounting
to felonies involving moral turpitude," either in an Oklahoma court or in a court
of any other State, is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal institution.
Id. at 536 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 173 (1935)).
100. Id. at 541.
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Skinner did not overrule Buck, the decision signaled a shift away from
the eugenics movement in the United States.0 1
The line of cases supporting a fundamental right to privacy also
compliments a fundamental right to procreate or to not procreate.'02
Griswold, in conferring a privacy right on married couples, granted the
right to choose whether to have children by allowing the use of
contraceptives.1 Though the controversy in Eisenstadt was resolved on
equal protection grounds, the Court employed far more revolutionary
concepts and language than in Griswold to describe the extended right of
procreative decision-making.'04 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan
avowed, "if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."'0 5  With this sentence, the Court
extended to individuals the right to control reproduction and decide
whether to procreate.""
Ostensibly, though Roe v. Wade't m concerns abortion, it also announced
a woman's right to make personal decisions regarding procreation.1
8
Roe was based on earlier cases related to both privacy and procreation.'
In granting a woman's limited right to an abortion, Justice Blackmun's
opinion averred a right to privacy and indicated that, regardless of
whether its textual authority is found in the Ninth Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment, the right to privacy "is broad enough to
101. Id. at 539-40 (distinguishing Skinner from Buck on equal protection grounds).
The Court reasoned that in Buck, sterilization was mandated for a group that was similarly
situated whereas in Skinner, the Oklahoma statute imposed arbitrary distinctions among
criminals, thereby violating equal protection. Id.
102. Sherri A. Jayson, Comment, "Loving Infertile Couple Seeks Woman Age 18-31 to
Help Have Baby. $ 6,500 Plus Expenses and a Gift": Should We Regulate the Use of
Assisted Reproductive Technologies by Older Women?, 11 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 287, 296
(2001).
103. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). This right is not as
explicitly defined in the opinion as the family right to privacy. See Dolgin, supra note 23,
at 1542 (suggesting that emphasis on the inviolability of the domestic sphere may have
been amplified in order to circumvent an acrimonious moral controversy regarding the
availability of contraception).
104. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1972); see also Katheryn D. Katz,
The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and Asexual Reproduction, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
1, 42 n.207, (1997) (noting that as the Court could not agree on whether a right to
contraception existed, they opted to strike down the Massachusetts statute on equal
protection grounds).
105. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
106. Id.
107. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
108. Id. at 153.
109. Id. at 152-53.
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encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.""0
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.. qualified a woman's right to obtain an
abortion."' Casey affirmed the Constitution's protection of an
individual's autonomy regarding personal decisions relating to
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education."" 3  As a requirement to obtain an abortion, Casey
replaced Roe's trimester framework with the "undue burden" standard."
4
This shift in standards may be viewed as downgrading the abortion right
from a fundamental right to a protected liberty interest. "5
Unlike the right not to procreate, the right to procreate has little
support in case law. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur"6 is the
only Supreme Court case that explicitly designates pregnancy as a
fundamental right."' The Supreme Court classified pregnancy as "one of
the basic civil rights of man."" 8
110. Id. at 153. However, this right is not absolute. Id. The majority opinion
announced that a trimester framework is appropriate for qualifying a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 163-64. In the first trimester, the woman has a plenary
interest in choosing whether to terminate her pregnancy. Id. In the second trimester, the
state can regulate to compel an interest in maternal health and safety. Id. at 163. In the
third trimester, the state has a plenary right to protect the fetus and a duty to protect the
mother. Id. at 163-64. The trimester framework prescribed in Roe was replaced with the
undue burden test introduced in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-79
(1992).
111. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
112. Id. at 872-79.
113. Id. at 851. Casey ostensibly affirms a woman's reproductive autonomy while
simultaneously upholding a law limiting this right. Id. at 882-84. The Court upheld a
Pennsylvania law mandating a twenty-four hour waiting period for obtaining an abortion,
that the woman be given detailed information about the fetus, and that the physician file a
report about the abortion that includes the name of the physician, the woman's age, the
number of prior pregnancies, the number of prior abortions, complications from the
abortion, the weight of the fetus, and whether the woman was married. Id. at 882-900.
114. Id. at 877 ("A finding of an undue burden is shorthand for the conclusion that a
state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of an unviable fetus.").
115. See David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests:
Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1566-71
(1992).
116. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
117. Id. at 650. Reproductive freedom may be viewed to include both the right to
avoid conception and the right to conceive:
The freedom to avoid conception and childbirth, however, is not the only
aspect of reproduction that needs legal protection. Another essential element of
procreative freedom is the right to become pregnant and to parent, a right that is
still ill-defined and in some respects unprotected by the law .... Full procreative
freedom would include both the freedom not to reproduce and the freedom to
reproduce when, with whom, and by what means one chooses.
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B. Who Decides? A Weighing of Rights
Once the right to bear or beget a child is established, the scope of the
right evolves. " 9 Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth12"
invokes the proposition that the locus of procreative decision-making
rests squarely with the mother.12 ' Finding the Missouri statute regulating
abortions unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held that a state could not
require the written consent of the spouse as a mandatory condition for
obtaining an abortion. 122 According to Danforth, procreative decision-
making rests squarely with the woman.
The advent of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) presented
courts with new challenges regarding rights to procreate and not
123 124procreate . In a line of cases known as the frozen embryo cases,courts were charged with deciding which right was stronger-the right to
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405,406 (1983).
118. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))
("[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that such rules must
not needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon this... constitutional liberty.").
119. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976); Davis v. Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
120. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
121. Id. at 67-75.
122. Id. at 67-72. In vesting ultimate decision-making authority with the mother, the
Court explained, "Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is
the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the
balance weighs in her favor." Id. at 71.
123. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
124. Id. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000), and Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174
(N.Y. 1998), among others, are known as the frozen embryo cases because they involve
the disposition of embryos preserved by cryopreservation. Cf. Jennifer Marigliano
Dehmel, Comment, To Have or Not To Have. Whose Procreative Rights Prevail in
Disputes over Dispositions of Frozen Embryos?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1380-82 (1995).
Cryopreservation is a multi-step process. Id. First, a woman's ovaries are stimulated to
produce multiple eggs. Id. at 1380. Next, the eggs are removed to a petri dish where the
sperm are introduced. Id. at 1381. Once the sperm fertilizes the egg, the preembryo
develops, and the cell division begins. Id. When the preembryo reaches the four or eight
cell stage, it is implanted into a woman's uterus. Id. Although this process is arduous and
painful, many frozen preembryos are created and may be preserved for up to ten years.
Id. The use of frozen embryos as a means to achieve conception has increased
dramatically:
In the United States as of 1990, approximately 23,468 embryos were in frozen
storage, and 350 babies had been born from frozen embryos. According to one
doctor who has long specialized in the field of assisted fertilization, there are now
"millions" of frozen embryos worldwide, an amount which, to his distress, is
ever-expanding.
Id. at 1382.
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procreate or the right not to procreate."2  In Davis v. Davis,126 the
divorcing couple had attempted in-vitro fertilization and failed. 27 Mrs.
Davis wished to donate the frozen pre-embryos, which she and her
husband had conceived through ART, to an infertile couple.12 8  In
opposition, Mr. Davis sought to destroy the frozen pre-embryos.9 The
Tennessee Supreme Court's analysis in Davis provided insight into the
judicial balancing of the right to procreate against the right to avoid
procreation.13 ' The court found that Mr. Davis's interests in avoiding
procreation were greater than Mrs. Davis's interest in donating the
embryos. 3' The court noted that Mrs. Davis could achieve parenthood
through other means, such as adoption or ART with another donor.13
The Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately found that "the party wishing
to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a
reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use
of the pre-embryos in question. 1 3 3 Therefore, Davis asserted that the
right to avoid procreation trumps the right to procreate when
procreation is possible through other means.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF No-CHILD PROVISIONS
A prenuptial agreement is both an agreement between two prospective
adult spouses and a contract. 34 As such, general contract requirements
125. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602-03 (noting that, due to the unique nature of the case, it
was incumbent on the court to balance the unique interests of the parties).
126. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
127. Id. at 589.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 603-04 ("One way of resolving these disputes is to consider the positions of
the parties, the significance of their interests, and the relative burdens that will be imposed
by different resolutions.").
131. Id. at 603 (noting that "an interest in avoiding genetic parenthood can be
significant enough to trigger the protections afforded to all other aspects of parenthood").
The court warned that the interests would be more competing if Mrs. Davis' competing
interest was to use the frozen pre-embryo attempt to bear a child who she would raise. Id.
at 604.
132. Id.
133. Id.; see also A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000) (finding
unenforceable a contract for the disposition of embryos which would, in effect, force the
father to become a parent). The Supreme Court of Massachusetts opined that "[als a
matter of public policy, we conclude that forced procreation is not an area amenable to
judicial enforcement .... [C]ourts will not enforce contracts that violate public policy."
Id. at 1057-58.
134. Compare UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 1(1), 9C U.L.A. 48 (2001)
(defining prenuptial agreements as "agreement[s] between prospective spouses made in
contemplation of marriage and to be effective upon marriage"), with Simeone v. Simeone,
581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (stating that "[p]renuptial agreements are contracts, and, as
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apply, as well as the provisions of the UPAA.13 Section 6 of the UPAA
assesses the enforceability of the term in question. 3 6 Section 3 of the
UPAA stipulates that parties may contract on matters "including their
personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a
statute imposing a criminal penalty.' 3 7 In assessing the enforceability of
the agreement, a court will consider the procedural and substantive
unconscionability of the agreement and public policies surrounding its
enforcement.'s
A. Procedural Unconscionability
A procedural unconscionability analysis focuses on whether a
contracting party had a "meaningful choice" in the bargaining process.39
If a party agrees to a contract term because either the other party uses
unfair bargaining tactics or the acquiescing party lacks understanding of
the contract terms, the contract may be found procedurally
unconscionable.'9 Since a no-child provision involves an absolute duty
to perform, an investigation of coercive conduct is appropriate but will
not directly resolve the issue of the enforceability. 4'
1. Timing
A particular concern in assessing procedural unconscionability and theS • 142
voluntariness of the contract is timing. The longer the time between
when the party was presented with the agreement and when the
agreement was executed, the greater the likelihood the contract
such, should be evaluated under the same criteria as are applicable to other types of
contracts").
135. Jennifer Kim, Contesting the Enforceability of a Premarital Agreement, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 133, 134 (1997). Prerequisites to a contract, such as offer,
acceptance, and consideration must be present for a prenuptial agreement to be valid. See
MORGAN & TURNER, supra note 12, at 375. Although section 6 of the UPAA requires
that a prenuptial agreement comply with the statute of frauds, at common law a prenuptial
agreement did not have to be in writing. Id. at 376.
136. See generally UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48 (2001).
137. Id. § 3(a)(8), 9 U.L.A. 43 (2001).
138. See discussion infra Part IV.
139. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 4.28, at 311.
140. Id. § 4.28 (stating that conduct at the time of bargaining that is misleading or
coercive may render the contract procedurally unconscionable).
141. A no-child provision generally stipulates that a child will not result from the
marriage. E-mail from Mitchell Schrage, Partner, Mitchell Schrage & Associates, PLLC,
to Joline F. Sikaitis, supra note 13; see also Ex parte Walters, 580 So. 2d 1352, 1354 (Ala.
1991) (upholding the agreement after one spouse threatened not to marry if the
agreement was not signed).
142. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CONTRACTS, supra note 2, at 10.
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execution was voluntary. 143  In the case of a no-child provision, the
provision itself would not trigger procedural unconscionability.
44
2. Lack of an Independent Counsel
Although independent counsel is an important factor to consider in
determining whether the parties voluntarily entered into the contract,
absent other defenses, it is insufficient to demonstrate a lack of
voluntariness. 145  However, if the party asserting procedural
unconscionability was unable to meet with an attorney or if the advice
was explained in an incomprehensible manner, the court may find the
voluntariness element absent.'
4 6
B. Who Decides What is Fair? Substantive Unconscionability
The UPAA invokes the substantive fairness requirement when
determining if the parties entered into the prenuptial agreement on equal
terms.47 It considers an agreement to be substantively unconscionable if
the signing party did not receive a full disclosure of assets from the party
seeking enforcement, did not sign a waiver of this right to disclosure, or
did not have a reason to know about the specifics of the enforcing party's
143. Id. The court, in establishing a gap in time, will generally consider the time at
which the parties first considered the prenuptial agreement, rather than the time the
parties entered into the agreement. See MORGAN & TURNER, supra note 12, at 397. In
cases where the parties had discussed the agreement well in advance of the wedding, the
court found the agreement to be voluntary. See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343,
1347-48 (Ohio 1994) (finding a prenuptial agreement entered into the day before the
marriage valid because all of the other prerequisites were met). In contrast, where the
agreement was sprung on the party just prior to the wedding with no advanced indication,
courts are more likely to find duress because of procedural unconscionability. E.g.,
Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142, 146-47 (Ohio 1984) (voiding the prenuptial contract
for procedural unconscionability, finding that as the wife saw the prenuptial contract for
the first time only one day prior to the wedding, she did not enter into it voluntarily).
144. See Zirnmie, 464 N.E.2d at 146.
145. E.g., In re Marriage Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (citing UNIF.
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Act § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48 cmt. (2001)).
146. In re Estate of Crawford, 730 P.2d 675, 678-79 (Wash. 1986) (reasoning that the
contract lacked the requisite voluntariness because the agreeing party, Mrs. Crawford, as a
result of not being able to consult with an attorney, could not understand the contract
terms and, therefore, did not enter into the agreement voluntarily); see also Orgler v.
Orgler, 568 A.2d 67, 70-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (reasoning that because the
plaintiff's attorney failed to advise her on the concepts of equitable distribution and
alimony, the plaintiff could not make a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of rights she
waived by signing). But see Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165-66 (Pa. 1990)
(reiterating that prenuptial agreements, like other contracts, bind the parties to the
agreement, regardless of the parties' understanding of the terms).
147. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001) (stating
the prenuptial contract is not valid if "the agreement was unconscionable when it was
executed").
2004] A New Form of Family Planning?
assets.4s In states where the UPAA has not been adopted and prenuptial
agreements are treated similarly to commercial contracts, a substantive
unconscionability defense is less likely to succeed.
149
A party seeking to avoid a no-child provision may be able to invoke
the doctrine of duress.'o To be successful, a party must prove that an
improper threat was made by the adverse party which left him or her
with "no reasonable alternative."'' Agreements signed under a threat of
physical violence, although few in number, will be found invalid.' 52 Other
threats, perhaps to call off the wedding, may not constitute duress, and
contracts signed under such threats will be upheld.
5
1
C. Abandonment, Ruled Out by the UPAA
To abandon a prenuptial agreement, a party must, through his or her
actions or a subsequent contract, repudiate his or her desire to be bound
to the terms of the contract. 114 Logically, abandonment would appear to
be an appropriate defense to a no-child provision."5 In states that have
not adopted the UPAA, the challenging party may successfully raise
abandonment as a defense.156  However, in jurisdictions that have
148. Id. § 6(a), 9C U.L.A. 48 (2001).
149. See PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CONTRACTS, supra note 2, at 61-62 ("Only
when the procedural standards are not met, does the substantive fairness of the agreement
become dispositive."). In non-UPAA jurisdictions, substantive fairness examination may
be applied either at the time of entry into the agreement or at the time of enforcement of
the agreement. See id. at 60. If the test is applied at the time of entry into the agreement,
the court will ask-did the parties have freedom of contract? Id. This question is circular,
as it will lead the court back to the procedural unconscionability analysis. Id. at 61-62; see
also Simeone, 581 A.2d at 166 (stating that "the reasonableness of a prenuptial bargain is
not a proper subject for judicial review").
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981).
151. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 335 (Fla. 1987) (finding a lack of
voluntariness where the husband threatened to blow up the house if the wife did not sign
the agreement).
153. See Ex parte Walters, 580 So. 2d 1352, 1354 (Ala. 1991) (finding a prenuptial
agreement valid despite the husband's threat to call off the wedding if the wife did not sign
the agreement). But cf. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1348 (Ohio 1994) (stating
that "[t]he presentation of an agreement a very short time before the wedding ceremony
will create a presumption of overreaching or coercion, in contrast to this case, the
postponement of the wedding would cause significant hardship, embarrassment, or
emotional stress").
154. See Liebelt v. Liebelt, 870 P.2d 9, 13 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); In re Marriage of
Burgess, 423 N.E.2d 203, 204 (I1. App. Ct. 1984).
155. See, e.g., Gustafon v. Jensen, 515 So. 2d 1298, 1300-01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
The court may infer abandonment from conduct, if the conduct of the parties is
unequivocally inconsistent with the terms of the agreement. E.g., McMullen v. McMullen,
185 So. 2d 191, 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
156. See, e.g., Gustafson, 515 So. 2d at 1300-01.
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adopted the UPAA, absent a written amendment or revocation, the
defense is not available. 57
D. Balancing or Juggling? The No-Child Provision Void as Against
Public Policy and the Weighing of Competing Interests
Section 3 of the UPAA delineates permissible content for a prenuptial
contract.' Although section 3 fails to mention no-child provisions, the
statute permits couples to contract concerning "any other matter,
including personal rights and obligations."' A public policy defense
invokes examination of existing laws, as well as countervailing societal• 160
views regarding the specific provision at issue. A court will find a
public policy defense compelling when nonenforcement would
discourage undesirable conduct or, conversely, enforcement would
constitute an inappropriate use of judicial resources. 6'
The freedom to contract is a fundamental right.' 62 However, despite
the core value of freedom of contract, a court may deny enforcement of a
provision if it is contrary to public policy.' To decide whether to void a
contract or a contract provision on the basis of public policy, a court
often invokes a common law balancing test, weighing factors supporting
enforcement against factors opposing it.
Similarly, a court will evaluate the cumulative weight of public policies
supporting enforcement of the no-child provision of the contract. First,
a court considers the "justified expectations of the parties."' 1 Second, a
court considers the losses a party may face after relying on the terms of
157. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACr § 5, 9C U.L.A. 48 (2001). The section
titled "Amendment, Revocation" provides that "[a]fter marriage, a premarital agreement
may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by the parties. The
amended agreement or the revocation is enforceable without consideration." Id.; cf.
PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CONTRACTS, supra note 2, at 29 (recommending that a
defense of abandonment may be precluded by drafting an anti-waiver provision in a
prenuptial agreement).
158. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 3, 9C U.L.A. 43 (2001).
159. Id. § 3(a)(8).
160. E.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384-85 (Fla. 1970) (balancing both pre-
existing case law and the increase in divorce rates when enforcing prenuptial agreements
made in contemplation of divorce).
161. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.1, at 322.
162. See id. § 5.1, at 321.
163. See In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 507 (Iowa 1979) (finding that a
spouse's attempt to avoid his duty of support through a waiver in a prenuptial agreement
void as against public policy).
164. Id. at 512.
165. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.1, at 323-26.
166. Id. at 324.
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the contract or provision. 167 Third, a court considers the possibility that
the party seeking to enforce the contract was unaware of the
countervailing public policy.
6 s
A court will weigh these factors supporting enforcement against
factors opposing enforcement of the contract or provision. 69  In
calibrating factors opposing the enforcement of a contract or provision,
the court first assesses the weight of the policy furthered by
nonenforcement.170 Next, the court considers if the nonenforcement of
the contract would enhance the public policy.'7 ' Finally, the court reflects
on the "seriousness and deliberateness of any misconduct that has
occurred" and the nexus between the contract or provision and the
172conduct at issue .
V. ARGUMENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-CHILD PROVISION
A. Do Privacy Rights Prevail? An Enforcing Party's Claim that the
Balance Weighs in His Favor
In initiating the balancing test to determine the appropriateness of
public policy as a defense to the contract, the court weighs the factors in
favor of enforcement. 173 The party seeking to enforce the agreement will
implicitly rely on ascendance of private ordering and the increased rights
of couples to arrange the structure and incidents of their relationships.
74
Attempting to demonstrate the reliance interest that was forfeited with
the child's birth and the breach of the no-child provision proves to be a
difficult and value-laden assessment, as no conceivable restitution exists
for the party who proposed the no-child provision. 15 In weighing the
enforcement of the public policy, the court will also consider "a party's
excusable ignorance of the contravention of public policy."'7 The party






172. Id. However, it is not imperative that the conduct at issue offend or contravene
public policy. Id. at 324-25.
173. Id.
174. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-65 (2003); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); Marvin v. Marvin, 557
P.2d 106, 111-14, 116 (Cal. 1976).
175. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 12.1, at 758. The court would
attempt to return the injured party back to the position he would have been in had the
contract not been made. Id.
176. Id. § 5.1, at 324.
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policy by relying on a constitutional right to privacy both individually and
in the marital relationship.1
B. The Enforcing Party's Assertion that the Right Not to Procreate Is
Stronger
The enforcing party may assert that his right not to procreate isS 178
stronger than the challenging spouse's right to procreate. He may
attempt to distinguish Danforth by construing it narrowly and may
suggest that it stipulates that a woman's decision is dispositive only when
the right to an abortion is at stake. 79 The enforcing party may offer the
frozen embryo cases, specifically Davis, as proof that if procreation can
occur through some other means, the party asserting the right not to
procreate should prevail.'8 The enforcing party may proffer that a no-
child provision written into a prenuptial agreement is not an absolute ban
on procreation, as the challenging party may have children at a different
time with a different person.18 ' Therefore, the enforcing party may
contend that enforcement of the provision would not infringe on a
fundamental right, but rather delay the exercise of that right.'8 Whereas
the party asserting the right to procreate can exercise that right at a later
time, the party asserting the right not to procreate lost the right when the
adverse party breached the no-child provision of the contract.1 3 As such,
if the no-child provision can be construed not as an absolute prohibition
on the exercise of the right, but rather as a delay in exercise of the right,
entanglement might not be triggered, and a court might lack a tangible
basis for voiding the contract9
177. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454 (expanding this right to privacy to unmarried
individuals). See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (conferring a right to privacy on married
couples).
178. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,604 (Tenn. 1992).
179. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
180. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
181. E.g., id. In rendering Mr. Davis' right to avoid procreation dispositive, the court
stated that if Mrs. Davis' right was operative, Mr. Davis "would face a lifetime of either
wondering about his parental status or knowing about his parental status but having no
control over it." Id.; Brooke, supra note 3 (recounting that a woman in New York who
had entered into a prenuptial agreement containing a no-child provision with her husband
was now separated from him and pregnant via artificial insemination).
182. Cf Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that minors'
fundamental right to marriage is only "temporarily suspended" by the imposition of a
parental consent requirement).
183. Cf Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
184. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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VI. PUBLIC INTERESTS IN PROCREATION AND MARRIAGE: FACTORS
AGAINST THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-CHILD PROVISION
A. Do Procreative Interests Prevail? The Challenging Party's Claim that
the Balance Weighs in Her Favor
In assessing the weight of factors against public policy as a defense to
the no-child provision, a court considers four factors: the gravity of the
policy; the likelihood that nonenforcement of the provision will further
the policy; the gravity of the misconduct expressed in the provision; and
the relationship between misconduct and the contract or provision.""
The challenging party will contend that explicit, firmly entrenched
interests exist in procreation, stable and natural families, and bodily
autonomy,'8 and she will proffer that no-child provisions contravene
these policies.'87 The attack will argue that enforcement of the contract
not only contradicts expressed policy, but also encourages couples to
contractually alter the incidents of their relationship and commodify
procreative processes.1
8 8
B. Enforcement Punishes the Exercise of a Fundamental Right
If a no-child provision were enforced, the withdrawal of an equity
share, spousal support, or the assessment of a penalty could be construed
as punishment for the exercise of a fundamental right. 8 9 In LaFleur, the
Supreme Court expressly declared impermissible the punishing of the
exercise of the fundamental right to pregnancy.' 9°  The dilemma
presented in the enforcement of a no-child provision could be analogized
to that in Danforth, as both attempt to wrest procreative decision-making
power away from a woman -one by law and one by contract.' 9'
185. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.1, at 324.
186. See discussion infra Part VI.A-C.
187. See discussion infra Part VI.A-C.
188. See discussion infra Part VII.A.3.
189. E-mail from Mitchell Schrage, Partner, Mitchell Schragc & Associates, PLLC, to
Joline F. Sikaitis, supra note 13.
190. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 643 (1974).
191. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976); LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 643;
see E-mail from Mitchell Schrage, Partner, Mitchell Schrage & Associates, PLLC, to
Joline F. Sikaitis, supra note 13.
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C. Courts Are Loathe to Enforce Prenuptial Agreements that Contract
Away a Fundamental Right
Individuals, through their conduct, may encroach upon one another's
protected liberties.' 92 However, if a court must enforce the contractual
infringement of another's liberty, it becomes entangled in the
infringement, and constitutional protections apply.9 In deciding
whether to enforce a no-child provision, a court is likely to frame the
issue similarly to how the Pennsylvania Superior Court framed it in
Zummo. 94 Zummo held that when courts are called upon to enforce
contracts, the court becomes a state actor. 195  Therefore, while an
individual may infringe on another's constitutionally protected rights and
liberties, a court may not. 9 The enforcement of a no-child provision in a
prenuptial contract requires the court to infringe on a woman's
fundamental right to procreate) 97
VII. No-CHILD PROVISIONS ARE UNENFORCEABLE
Despite the ascendance of private ordering, no-child provisions are
unenforceable.'98 A court will void or sever no-child provisions either
because the term and its consequences contravene prevailing public
policy (and it wishes to discourage the creation of such terms in the
future) or because the provision inappropriately entangles the judiciary
in the infringement of a fundamental right 99 Both interpretations
192. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883) (holding thc Fourteenth
Amendment is not applicable to the conduct of a private actor or entity).
193. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, § 6.4.1 (noting that if the government
"affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates" the infringement, then either the
private actor must comply with the Constitution or the government must cease its
involvement). Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19, 20 (1948), very clearly states that, in
enforcing the contract, the government becomes involved and the Fourteenth
Amendment is triggered.
194. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1144-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
195. Id.; see Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14.
196. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14. Even though the fundamental right to procreate may be
supported by the greater weight of case law, the right to procreate is, nonetheless, a
fundamental right as well. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639-40.
197. See discussion infra Part VII.B.
198. See discussion infra Part VII.
199. Id.; see City of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) ("The relevant policy
is well established: a promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by the enforcement of the
agreement."); see, e.g., Davies v. Grossmont, 930 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991) (voiding a
contract in which a teacher signed away his right to run for public office in a settlement
agreement with his former employer, the Grossmont Union High School District, because
there was no public policy critical enough to outweigh the teacher's right to run for public
office). In reaching its conclusion, the Davies court stated, "The question whether the
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express the same underlying value-individuals do not have an unlimited
ability to structure their private relationships.20
A. Public Policies Opposing Enforcement Outweigh Policies Favoring
Enforcement
In states that have adopted the UPAA, the law permits content "not in
violation of public policy." 20 ' A public interest in the rights to privacy
and private ordering prevails; however, this right is not unlimited 2
Cumulatively, interests in procreation, marital stability, natural families,
and the procreative decision-making of women trump privacy interests.
2 0 3
By voiding or severing a no-child provision, a court will clarify and
promote the public policies at issue and discourage the creation of such
provisions in the future.2
1. The State Has an Unequivocal Interest in Procreation
The state has expressed its interest in procreation in justifications for
not extending marriage to same-sex couples.20o  Explicitly, the law
distinguishes opposite-sex marriage from same-sex relationships on the
waiver of federal constitutional rights is enforceable is a question of federal law, which we
resolve by the application of federal common law." Id.
200. Some scholars caution against complete freedom of contract in prenuptial
agreements:
Premarital agreements should be greeted with skepticism, not embraced with
enthusiasm. In addition to strengthening the "freedom of contract" principle and
supporting individual autonomy, the law governing the enforcement of
premarital agreements should be fashioned to effectuate other public policies:
the eradication of gender discrimination and the attainment of economic justice
for the economically vulnerable spouse at the end of a marriage. The tension
between these policies and the "freedom of contract" principle can be reconciled
by the adoption of a regime that enforces a premarital agreement only if the
agreement attains economic justice for the economically vulnerable spouse or,
failing that, if the bargaining process culminating in execution of the agreement
was demonstrably fair.
Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
229, 295 (1994).
201. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACr § 3(a)(8), 9C U.L.A. (2001).
202. See discussion infra Part 1.
203. See discussion infra Part VII.A.
204. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.1, at 324.
205. E.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 463-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that despite the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, Arizona's
prohibition of same-sex marriage is not unconstitutional because the state has an interest
in procreation and child-rearing within the marital relationship). The court of appeals
stated, "Because same-sex couples cannot by themselves procreate, the State could also
reasonably decide that sanctioning same-sex marriages would do little to advance the
State's interest in ensuring responsible procreation within committed, long-term
relationships." Id. at 463.
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basis of procreation. 206 The legislative history of the Defense of Marriage
Act boldly argues, "the [G]overnment has an interest in marriage simply
because it has an interest in children."207 In addition, throughout the line
of abortion cases, while the Court extended a liberty interest in abortion
to women, it consistently averred the state interest in the viability of the
fetus. 2 0 Enforcement of a no-child provision would expressly contradict
public policies favoring procreation offered in justifications that limit
209marital and abortion rights .
2. Marital Stability Is an Expressed Public Interest
The state has a clear interest in marital stability.20 Federal and state
expenditures for the creation of programs encouraging marital stability
reflect this interest.2 11  The benefits that flow from marriage confirm its
status as a public interest.
2
206. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 13 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2917
(noting "civil society has an interest in maintaining and protecting the institution of
heterosexual marriage because it has a deep and abiding interest in encouraging
responsible procreation and child-rearing").
207. Id.
208. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
209. E.g., Baxter, supra note 3; Brooke, supra note 3 ("One part of the bargain,
however, is almost never mentioned: successful men who have raised children with Wife
No. 1 often insist that their subsequent, younger spouses must forgo having children.
Matrimonial lawyers say the arrangement, though legally dubious, is increasingly being
written into prenuptial agreements.").
210. See H.R. REP. No. 104-668, at 13.
211. Press Release, The White House, Working Towards Independence (Feb. 26,
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-
announcement-book.pdf. Policies championed by the executive branch explicitly promote
marriage:
[I]t is simply wise and prudent to reorient our policies to encourage marriage,
especially when children are involved. For this reason, the Administration plan
commits up to $300 million per year for states to design and implement programs
that reduce nonmarital births and increase the percentage of children in married-
couple families ....
The Administration's proposal will establish a $100 million annual fund
to conduct research and demonstration projects, and provide technical assistance
primarily focusing on family formation and healthy marriage activities.
Id. at 2, 20. The authors of the press release emphasize an incontrovertible link between
an intact marriage and healthy child development. Id. at 2. In finding Massachusetts's law
banning gay marriage unconstitutional, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also
stressed the need for strong family units:
[AIII children, need and should have the fullest opportunity to grow up in a
secure, protected family unit. Similarly, no one disputes that, under the rubric of
marriage, the State provides a cornucopia of substantial benefits to married
parents and their children. The preferential treatment of civil marriage reflects
the Legislature's conclusion that marriage "is the foremost setting for the
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In Davis, the court distinguished between a prohibition and a delay in
the exercise of a right.213 A no-child provision framed as a delay of the
procreative right means that the spouse is free to exercise this right with
another partner or by another means. It implicates divorce as an
appropriate step toward the exercise of this right.' 4 This interpretation
of a no-child provision conveys that the exercise of the right to procreate,
in which the state has a strong interest, may only be achieved through
divorce, a legal action contrary to public interest.21 Applying the Davis
education and socialization of children" precisely because it "encourages parents
to remain committed to each other and to their children as they grow."
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003) (quoting Id. at 996
(Cordy, J., dissenting)).
212. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955-57. The decision specifically delineates some of
the benefits that flow from marriage in the state of Massachusetts.
The benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous,
touching nearly every aspect of life and death. The department states that
"hundreds of statutes" are related to marriage and to marital benefits. With no
attempt to be comprehensive, we note that some of the statutory benefits
conferred by the Legislature on those who enter into civil marriage include, as to
property: joint Massachusetts income tax filing; tenancy by the entirety (a form
of ownership that provides certain protections against creditors and allows for
the automatic descent of property to the surviving spouse without probate);
extension of the benefit of the homestead protection (securing up to $300,000 in
equity from creditors) to one's spouse and children; automatic rights to inherit
the property of a deceased spouse who does not leave a will; the rights of elective
share and of dower . . .; entitlement to wages owed to a deceased employee;
eligibility to continue certain businesses of a deceased spouse; the right to share
the medical policy of one's spouse; thirty-nine week continuation of health
coverage for the spouse of a person who is laid off or dies; preferential options
under the Commonwealth's pension system; preferential benefits in the
Commonwealth's medical program, MassHealth; . . . financial protections for
spouses of certain Commonwealth employees (fire fighters, police officers, and
prosecutors, among others) killed in the performance of duty; the equitable
division of marital property on divorce; temporary and permanent alimony
rights, the right to separate support on separation of the parties that does not
result in divorce; and the right to bring claims for wrongful death and loss of
consortium, and for funeral and burial expenses and punitive damages resulting
from tort actions.
Id. at 955-56 (citations omitted).
213. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992). The court reasoned that if
the party seeking to procreate could do so at another time, with another party or in
another manner, her right to procreate was not prohibited but rather merely delayed. Id.
214. See Brooke, supra note 3 (describing how a woman who had acceded to a no-child
provision of a prenuptial agreement was now separated from her husband and pregnant
via artificial insemination).
215. Such regulation demonstrates that the characterization of marriage as a private
contract is misplaced:
For all the talk of the increasing "privatization" of family law, we are far from a
system in which parties are free to contract for any marital arrangement that they
want. Aside from the restrictions on termination provisions in [prenuptial
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:335
framework to enforce a no-child provision results in the promotion of
contradictory public policies, given the government's interest in marital
stability.2 6 Therefore, construction of a no-child provision as a delay in
the exercise of a fundamental right is misplaced since it would implicitly
contravene an expressed policy promoting marital stability.2 7
3. Nonenforcement of the Contract Discourages the Commodification
of Procreative Processes
Disdain for, and the pervasive illegality of, surrogacy contracts reflects
courts' concern that the enforcement of reproductive contracts will
commodify reproduction and undermine women's autonomy in
procreative decision-making. 8 State treatment of surrogacy contracts• • • 219
turns on an important distinction. Surrogacy contracts, in which the
surrogate is not paid and may freely rescind her promise to give the child
to the contracting parties, remain generally enforceable, whereas,
contracts involving the exchange of money and forbidding the woman
from changing her mind are generally construed as illegal.220 No-child
provisions parallel the latter type of surrogacy contract.221 Inherent in a
no-child provision of a prenuptial agreement lies irrevocable consent and
a fungible exchange of an equity stake, property interest, or spousal
support for the forbearance of a procreative right.22 Enforcement of a
agreements], potential mates cannot bind themselves legally to marriages in
which spouses' domestic, financial, and sharing obligations are specified by
contract. Polygamous and same-sex marriages are prohibited. These laws are not
default rules, but restrictions on freedom of marital contract, and they strikingly
distinguish family law from contract law.
Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 256 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
216. See In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 295 (Cal. 1973).
217. See id.
218. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988). Cataloging the reasons why
surrogacy contracts offend public policy, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated, "In
surrogacy, the highest bidders will presumably become the adoptive parents regardless of
suitability, so long as payment of money is permitted." Id.; compare Margery Maguire
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for
Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 296, 335 (1990) (delineating the relationship
between surrogacy contracts and the commodification of human life), with Radhika Rao,
Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 951, 955-56 (1996) (suggesting that the denial of constitutional rights to surrogate
mothers through the denial of their fundamental right to procreate would be deleterious
and disempowering).
219. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1264.
220. Id.
221. See infra text accompanying notes 140.
222. See E-mail from Mitchell Schrage, Partner, Mitchell Schrage & Associates, PLLC,
to Joline F. Sikaitis, supra note 13 (noting that violation of a no-child provision would
result in either a cessation of spousal support, the waiver of some equity interest, or the
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no-child provision, like enforcement of a surrogacy contract, would
promote the notion that a woman's reproductive rights may be bought
and sold, thus commodifying the procreative process and offending
public policy.
223
The enforcement of a no-child provision would ignore case law
concerning the locus of procreative decision-making.2 The Supreme
Court's decision in Danforth clearly stigulates that the woman has a
greater interest in procreative decisions. Procreative decision-making
is a woman's inalienable right through the first trimester of her
pregnancy. 26 Enforcing a no-child provision denies this inalienability
and forces a woman to live with "the consequences of prior decisions that
are no longer consistent with the values and preferences of the person
she has become.,
227
4. Factors in Favor of Contract Enforcement Are Tenuous
In a no-child provision, the party seeking to enforce the agreement
expects that the court will enforce his arrangement attempting to alter
the incidents of the marital relationship.228 Consequently, this party
payment of a penalty). Decisions on surrogacy suggest that it is impossible to revoke
parental rights in advance of the birth of a child. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248 ("In
surrogacy, consent occurs so early that no amount of advice would satisfy the potential
mother's need, yet the consent is irrevocable.").
223. See Shultz, supra note 218, at 335.
224. In a state where the UPAA had been adopted, once a spouse acceded to a no-
child provision in a contract, the term could only be avoided if the couple in writing jointly
agreed to amend or revoke the term. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 5, 9C
U.L.A. 47 (2001) ("After marriage, a premarital agreement may be amended or revoked
only by a written agreement signed by the parties. The amended agreement or the
revocation is enforceable without consideration."). In states where prenuptial agreements
are construed similarly to commercial contracts, the general test for abandonment may
apply:
[A] contract may be abandoned by mutual consent and that such consent may be
implied from the acts and conduct of the parties. A contract will be treated as
abandoned when the acts of one party, inconsistent with its existence, or
acquiesced in by another. Where acts and conduct are relied upon to constitute
abandonment, however, they must be positive, unequivocal and inconsistent with
intent to be further bound by the contract.
H.T.C. Corp. v. Olds, 486 P.2d 463, 466 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (citations omitted). As
such, absent an express writing, abandonment may be a more viable defense in non-
UPAA jurisdictions. Id.
225. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
226. Id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
227. Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An
Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 96 (1999).
228. In asserting his right to structure incidents of personal relationships, the enforcing
party would rely on a constitutional right to privacy. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 564-65 (2003). This assumption relies on the prominence of private ordering and the
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either expects to have no children from the marriage or expects that the
birth of the child will absolve him of support or equity transfer
obligations.229 The enforcing party's reliance on judicial acquiescence to
the alteration of the marital relationship is contrary to the courts'
reluctance to enforce family promises and the prominence of the best
interest of the child standard.2 3' These interests would, in effect, diminish
the enforcing parties' privacy interests.23' Furthermore, interests in
procreation, marital stability, and women's reproductive rights outweigh
a limited privacy.
B. Enforcement of a No-Child Provision Fails Strict Scrutiny and
Excessively Entangles Courts
Although individuals are free to contract away fundamental rights
privately, the concept of excessive entanglement offers that, when a court
enforces the contract, it becomes entangled and due process limits
apply.232 The abridgement of a fundamental right, enforced by a court,
triggers a substantive due process analysis that requires a strict scrutiny
standard of review. 233 The end must represent a compelling state interest
and the means, enforcement of the contract, must be narrowly tailored to
development of a right to privacy within intimate relationships. Id.; Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Marvin v.
Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976). Contra In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1254 n.13
(N.J. 1988) ("As a general rule, a person should be accorded the right to make decisions
affecting his or her own body, health, and life, unless that choice adversely affects others."
(emphasis added)).
229. E-mail from Mitchell Schrage, Partner, Mitchell Schrage & Associates, PLLC, to
Joline F. Sikaitis, supra note 13.
230. A no-child provision would be breached by the birth of a child. See DOLGIN,
supra note 34, at 217 (noting the prominence of the "best interest of the child" standard);
see also Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1567
(1984) ("[S]ubstantial limitations on freedom of contract . . . are appropriate, at least if
there are dependent children at the time of divorce."); cf Andrew Kull, Reconsidering
Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 52 (1992) (discussing the reluctance of courts
to enforce family promises).
231. Cf Glendon, supra note 230, at 1567.
232. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1948); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, §
6.4.3.
233. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(articulating that a due process analysis is appropriate when government action infringes
on a fundamental right); cf. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) ("The protections
of substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to
marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity."); LEE EPSTEIN &
THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA 417 (3d. ed.
1998) (commenting on the application of strict constitutional scrutiny when the
fundamental right to privacy is abridged).
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the end.234 A no-child provision fails a substantive due process analysis
and inappropriately entangles the court in the infringement of a
fundamental right.
1. Avoidance of Procreation in the Marital Relationship Is Not a
Compelling State Interest
The avoidance of children in the marital relationship is not a clearly
expressed public interest.235 Upholding the pervasive standard of the best
interest of the child and the expressed state interest in procreation
support policies supporting procreation in the marital relationship. 2m
Furthermore, expressed interests implicate a clear policy favoring
237procreation in the marital relationship.
2. Even if Avoidance of Procreation Were a Compelling Interest, It Is
Not Narrowly Tailored
It is important to differentiate between the concept of not wanting
children to result from a marriage and the embodiment of that volition in
238a contract. If the party does not desire to have children, he or she maytake other steps to carry out this desire. 239 When less restrictive means
234. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (stipulating that fundamental rights may
not be abridged by the government "unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest").
235. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-05 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the
right to procreate was outweighed by the right to avoid procreation because the child
would be born to divorced parents). But see MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED 54 (1997)
(noting the state does not seek to further its compelling interest in procreation within a
marriage by mandating sterility tests or inquiring about future plans for procreation).
236. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized a state interest in procreation. In
Casey, the Court held that the state possesses "legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become
a child." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
237. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (reasoning that "the state has a compelling interest in encouraging
and fostering procreation of the race and providing status and stability to the environment
in which children are raised").
238. See infra Part I.B; see also Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Mass. 1974) ("We
would not order either a husband or wife to do what is necessary to conceive a child or to
prevent conception, any more than we would order either party to do what is necessary to
make the other happy.").
239. If a couple mutually desires to avoid procreation, they may use contraception.
See generally Birth Control, WEBMDHEALTH, at http://my.webmd.com/hw
healthy_women/hw237877.asp (last updated June 1, 2003). If the husband wishes to avoid
procreation absolutely, he may opt for a vasectomy. See generally Marvin Ross,
Vasectomy: A Permanent Option, WEBMDHEALTH, at http://my.webmd.com/
content/article/14/1685_50045.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). If the wife desires to avoid
procreation permanently, she may seek a hysterectomy. Hysterectomy, WEBMDHEALTH,
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exist to achieve an end, the state action in question is not narrowly
tailored and does not satisfy the requirements of strict scrutiny.240
VIII. CONCLUSION
The increase in both prenuptial agreements and no-child provisions
therein suggests that the enforceability of these provisions will soon
require judicial resolution. These provisions challenge a court to balance
competing rights and contemplate the court's role in private
relationships.
The ascendance of private ordering and the increased ability of couples
to structure the terms of their relationships support enforcement of the
no-child provision. Nonetheless, the right to privacy is not unlimited.
When private actors seek judicial intervention in enforcement of a
contract, public policy and constitutional concerns become operative.
Penalizing a woman for exercising a fundamental right offends prevailing
public policies concerning marital stability and a woman's procreative
rights. Despite increasing emphasis on the right of individuals to be left
alone, a court is loathe to be an actor in subverting public policies,
intruding on a couple's private relationship, and altering the incidents of
marriage.
at http://mywebmd.com/hw/womens-conditions/aa68979.asp (last updated Aug. 7, 2003).
Not one of these options require the involvement of the judicial process.
240. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, § 10.1.2.
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